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The Antitrust Bulletin/Summer 1988
Introduction
BY JAMES F. PONSOLDT*
As the 1988 Presidential election approaches, the appropriateness
of a retrospective examination of the Reagan Administration's
treatment of and effect upon antitrust law and policy has been
confirmed by recent events.
Bill Curran, editor of this journal, first tentatively suggested
the project to me in the fall of 1986. At- that time, megamergers
were at their unchallenged zenith; Robert Bork and Richard
Posner were likely candidates for the Supreme Court; the "Chi-
cago School" approach had coopted or silenced the majority of
mainstream academic antitrusters; the Heritage Foundation was a
major pipeline for government appointments; and former law-
enforcement moderates and antitrust precedent from the Nixon-
Ford-Carter years regularly were castigated as "liberal" or
"antibusiness" in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal,
which had become recognized as the Izvestia of the executive
branch.
Hearings conducted by the U.S. House Monopolies Subcom-
mittee, chaired by Peter Rodino, became the sole important
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia, Athens.
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forum' for the few vocal dissenters. Committee members and
witnesses argued that controlling inequitable wealth distribution
was a legitimate subject of legislation, that free markets required
policing, and that, barring a legitimate constitutional challenge,
existing laws ought to be enforced, even by an executive branch
that disfavors those "inefficient" laws.' But the House Monopo-
lies Subcommittee was alone in its opposition to Administration
antitrust policy. If a retrospective had been solicited from impar-
tial academics, practitioners, and government officials during
1986, the effect of the Reagan Administration on antitrust would
have been described as revolutionary and permanent.'
In the intervening months, however, the anti-antitrust climate
has changed. The Democrats have won control of the Senate.'
1 Prior to 1986, of course, the existence of a Republican majority
in the United States Senate allowed Hon. Strom Thurmond to be named
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. One of Senator Thur-
mond's first actions as Chairman was to disband the Senate's Monopo-
lies Subcommittee and thereby control antitrust policy from his position
as Committee Chairman. The elimination of a subcommittee devoted to
antitrust prevented the kind of subcommittee hearings and testimony,
critical of executive branch nonenforcement of antitrust legislation, that
continued in the House Monopolies Subcommittee.
2 For a recent discussion of whether "inefficient" laws should be
applied as intended by Congress, or rewritten by the judiciary, see Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir.,
1988). As the dissent by Judge Mikva makes clear, 837 F.2d at 1152, the
popular view that judges appointed by the Reagan Administration uni-
formly adhere to a policy of "judicial restraint" is utter nonsense.
3 See, for example, the editorial by former Dean Ernest Gellhorn
in the January 6, 1983 issue of the Wall Street Journal summarizing the
"lasting impact" of William Baxter, the Reagan Administration's first
antitrust chief. See also, the responses to that editorial in the January
27, 1983 issue of the Journal.
4 With that victory, Hon. Joseph Biden assumed Chairmanship of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, reestablished the Monopolies Subcom-
mittee, and allowed Hon. Howard Metzenbaum to become Chairman of
that Subcommittee. The Senate Monopolies Subcommittee now pursues
its antitrust oversight responsibilities with vigor equal to that of the
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The popular resentment toward merger-mania based upon result-
ing economic trauma and hardship in the Midwest and South has
mobilized antimerger policy. The Iran-Contra embroglio has
undermined support for Administration policy among moderate
legislators and voters.' Mainstream antitrust academics regained
their courage, common sense and voice at a national conference
held in early 1987 at the Airlie House.' The state attorneys
general, through their national organization, have criticized the
Justice Department's noninterventionist vertical restraint and
merger guidelines and acted upon their own views of antitrust.
The Supreme Court upheld Indiana's antitakeover law,7 spurring
many states to propose similar, or more far-reaching antimerger
laws.8 Insider trading scandals and the October, 1987 stock
market crash renewed calls for the policing of corporate take-
overs. And Robert Bork will not bring his antitrust views to the
Supreme Court.
House Subcommittee. The looming retirement of Chairman Rodino, in
fact, suggests that Senate antitrust oversight might become increasingly
important.
5 The Administration's foreign policy is symptomatic of its domes-
tic policy: to oppose and decline to enforce democratically created regu-
lation of business on the ground that such regulation is anticapitalist
and anti-free market. See generally, Ponsoldt, Cowboys of Capital,
New York Times, editorial page, March 13, 1987, and Ponsoldt, Anti-
trust: When Law Clashes With a Truth, New York Times, editorial
page, January 3, 1984.
6 See generally, PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE AIRLIE HOUSE CONFER-
ENCE ON THE ANTITRUST ALTERNATIVE, 62 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW
REvEw 927-1172 (1987).
7 CTS Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.
1637 (1987).
8 See A Takeover Law Grows in Delaware, The National Law
Journal, April 11, 1988, p. 1. See also, for example, proposed Georgia
Bill S.R. 524, introduced in the 1988 session of the Georgia General
Assembly, which would give local governments in Georgia the power to
seek Court injunctions to prevent any corporate takeover resulting in a
factory shut down and consequent loss of more than 50 jobs in the
respective local community.
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Reminiscent of Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential cam-
paign, moderate politicians, traditional antitrust scholars, state
law enforcement officials, mainstream economists and disen-
chanted small business constituencies recognize that "extremism"
in defense of economic liberty may indeed be a vice; moderating
the goals of free market capitalism with the commands of a
democratic political system may indeed be a virtue. We have
reached the stage where common sense has begun to overtake and
question ideology. In this symposium issue, for example, econo-
mist William Shepherd asks "how such an odd idea as [a central
hypothesis of Chicago School economics and Reaganomics] could
gain any credence, much less widespread assent."' Elsewhere,
John Flynn and I have questioned how Chicago Schoolers could
have persuaded courts to accept the premise that distribution
restraints which raise consumer prices and restrict consumer
choice nevertheless promote "consumer welfare."'"
The Antitrust Bulletin and its readers are fortunate to receive
the views of the distinguished contributors to this two-issue
symposium, and to receive those views in 1988, potentially a
watershed year in antitrust, rather than several years earlier.
Some of the authors focus upon particular antitrust issues,
whereas others have chosen to take a broader view of the Reagan
Administration's efforts and impact on antitrust. The articles
reflect some differences of opinion, of course. The symposium as
a whole, however, is marked by the recognition that the most
suitable antitrust policy must balance government intervention,
on the one hand, with economic libertarianism, on the other.
Perhaps the crucial point to be made about Reagan antitrust
policy and Chicago School economic theory is that the policy and
theory do not purport to be justified by normative politics. The
goal of current economic policy is to maximize aggregate societal
9 Shepherd, Three 'Efficiency School' Hypotheses About Market
Power, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN - (
10 Flynn and Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis
in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW
REvIEw 1125 (1987).
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wealth by maximizing allocative efficiency; government should
not intervene, the policy posits, unless business conduct reduces
allocative efficiency, a result which by hypothesis will not happen
in the absence of certain forms of competitor collusion.
Thus, the current policy purports to consider only effects on
aggregate societal wealth (defined in a peculiarly circumscribed
manner) of private business conduct and its regulation, not the
distribution of that wealth among voter constituencies. Yet the
control of wealth distribution, in our democracy, is a profoundly
political question and within Congress' Article I responsibilities.
To the extent that Congress undertook to effect societal
wealth distribution, and not simply wealth maximization, when it
enacted the Sherman, Clayton, Robinson-Patman, Celler-
Kefauver, and other antitrust acts during the last century, it
expressly relegated economic "efficiency" policy to a subordinate
role." As the Wall Street Journal itself details, the Reagan years
have been marked by a growing income inequality between the
wealthy and poorer segments of our population and by a relative
decline in economic growth and productivity.'2 No legitimately
functioning democracy can be expected to ignore significant
disparities in wealth distribution among its voters; no democracy
can reduce fundamental political choice to purely economic
determinants.
The administration's merger policy and criticisms of that
policy, which are described by contributors to this symposium,
are representative of the continuing antitrust debate. Recurring
antiinterventionist themes may be summarized in four categories:
(1) Property owners should be allowed to control and dispose of
their property as they choose, without government interference,
simply as an ideological matter-an attribute of "liberty"; (2)
antitrust enforcement should be viewed as "antibusiness" since it
impedes efforts to increase capital formation and attract private
11 See Boise Cascade, supra note 2, Mikva, J., dissenting. See also,
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Standard Oil of Califor-
nia v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
12 The Outlook, The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1988, p. 1.
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sector investment; (3) private cooperation and consolidation, by
allowing businesses to eliminate "duplicated" labor, distribution
and fixed costs, increase operating efficiency and therefore, by
increasing the short-term profitability of consolidated businesses,
increase, rather than decrease, market competition; and (4) a free
"market for corporate control," allowing assets to be sold by
rational businessmen to the highest bidder, increases "allocative
efficiency" by allowing assets to be put to their "best" use,
thereby maximizing aggregate societal wealth.
Each justification for nonintervention reflects a normative
political judgment which historically has not been supported by
fundamental American democratic choices, at least when invoked
during periods of private sector consolidation, cooperation and
concentration. Of course, even during the prointerventionist
1960s, government generally recognized that most mergers are
competitively neutral and that consolidations can be procompeti-
tive. However, the vast increase in size and number of mergers,
joint ventures and other consolidations during the last seven years
has been tolerated and reinforced by the current Administration,
and an intellectual "victory" has been claimed for neoclassical
efficiency analysis.
The following responses to claims of premature "victory" are
appropriate:
1. The economic libertarian ideology used to defend an absolut-
ist view of private property rights is common not in "one
man, one vote" democracies but in "one dollar, one vote"
autocracies. In the United States, libertarian arguments and
private property rights are subject to legitimate democratic
control, and that majority view has been expressed as law.
2. Antibusiness rhetoric has no relevance in the antimerger
context, since significant beneficiaries of antitrust enforce-
ment include independent business. Those smaller business
beneficiaries are sources of great comparative growth in
productivity and innovation. Antitrust, designed to police
and protect the free market, is probusiness not antibusiness.
The vast majority of antitrust private plaintiffs are busi-
nesses. "Antibusiness" characterizations of traditional anti-
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trust enforcement are a symptom of a deference to private
market concentration that promotes a bureaucratization of
business that is inferior to decentralized markets.
3. Competitor acquisitions and cooperation, by allowing the
acquiring or cooperating company to eliminate duplicated
workers and facilities, indeed increase operating efficiency
and profitability. But those efficiency gains, in comparatively
concentrated markets, are not procompetitive and are only
short-term. Merger cost-savings often must be used to pay
acquisition debt. Alternatively, any savings are often accu-
mulated or distributed to shareholders; savings are not
passed to consumers as price reductions. Thus the very
merger which created the savings also reduces the competitive
spur that reinforces price discounting. Short-term financial
manipulation replaces long-term productivity and output
gains. Thus, while increased business rivalry promotes effi-
cient markets, "efficient" participants in those markets, if
the participant is dominant and the market concentrated,
often do not promote market competition or remain effi-
cient.
4. Perhaps the most important claim involves "allocative effi-
ciency." Allocative efficiency is central to free market econo-
mies and explains why antitrust policy has been used
historically as a weapon to challenge more intrusive govern-
ment entry licensing and rate regulation. The problem is that
the economics concept has been applied beyond its intuitive
limits to invalidate democratic control of economic concen-
tration. Thus, the most economically "efficient" society, in
theory, could be one in which all wealth eventually is cen-
trally controlled-a politically unacceptable result whether or
not that control is in public or private hands. But, within the
past ten years, the wealthiest Americans have become
wealthier, whereas the poorest have become worse off:
wealth concentration has become more inequitable as merger
mania has flourished.
Furthermore, the "wealth maximization" claim for corporate
consolidation and cooperation is based upon an overly simplistic
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accounting definition of "wealth," which assumes that aggregate
wealth increases when buyers pay to sellers a higher price for
particular assets: that simply by inflating the cost basis of an
asset, a transaction will increase or create "wealth." In real value
productivity terms, a free market for corporate control may, but
does not necessarily, maximize wealth-productivity-in the
aggregate. A noninterventionist policy toward mergers has not
produced the hypothesized wealth enhancement, except for those
in the financial and investment community. Rather, taxpayers,
workers, consumers and small business suppliers simply have
transferred wealth to investors and financiers.
For many observers, including readers of this symposium, a
key question in 1988 is whether the Reagan Administration's
economic noninterventionism will have a permanent impact upon
American antitrust law and policy. None of the authors in this
symposium attempts a definite answer to that question, recogniz-
ing the vagaries of politics and the uncertainty of our world
economic condition. Some advocates of the laissez falre continue
to advance the self-serving claim that the "future is inevitable; as
an oxymoron, antitrust is obsolete." 3
While the hyperbole of argument is limited only by the
certainty of the advocate," two facts cannot be disputed. First,
13 Austin, Book Review of Issues After a Century of Federal Com-
petition Policy, - THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN __ ( ). See, for
a contrary view, Tougher Antitrust Stance Expected, The New York
Times, April 4, 1988, p. 23: "Enforcement of federal antitrust laws is
likely to become significantly more aggressive, particularly regarding
mergers, no matter which party wins the White House in November,
many lawyers and members of Congress believe . . . . The antitrust
policy of the recent Reagan years has been widely disparaged, largely
because the Administration has failed to challenge more than a few of
the many billion-dollar mergers and takeovers."
14 In The Tides of Change, The National Law Journal, April 18,
1988, pp. 1, 21-28, for example, former Antitrust Division head William
Baxter, an academic, is quoted as arguing that, "with the exception of a
handful of lunatic populists, even liberal Democrats are persuaded that
economic soundness is something that we should be seeking," at p. 26.
Bruce Fein, another former Justice Department official and now a fel-
low at the Heritage Foundation, is quoted as saying that, "no one
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the Reagan Administration has not succeeded in implementing
statutory change in our antitrust jurisprudence. By comparison,
the growth of antitrust from the mid-1930s through the late 1960s
was marked by two existing statutes-the Robinson-Patman Act
and the Celler-Kefauver Act-in which Congress quite clearly
codified its intention to promote deconcentration, to disperse
economic power and to protect independent business, regardless
of short-term efficiency consequences. Second, this growth of
antitrust coincided with an immense growth in American produc-
tivity, international competitiveness, foreign trade surplus,
median per capita income and equitable distribution of wealth.
By contrast, the subsequent years have been marked by declines
in comparative productivity, international competitiveness, trade
superiority and inequitable wealth distribution.
Unlike the growth of antitrust, which was a political response
to the laissez faire and economic collapses of the 1880s and 1920s,
the recent return of laissez faire has not been responsive to any
emergency or popular demand. The likelihood is that if tradi-
tional antitrust does not survive, it will be supplanted not by a
laissez faire cloaked as efficiency analysis, but by the opposite
extreme: industrial policy and more intrusive government control.
The Depression of the 1930s brought us not only Thurman
Arnold, it must be remembered, but also the most significant
increase in federal economic regulation in our history. Much of
FDR's New Deal legislation immunized vast segments of our
economy from antitrust.
In the event that traditional antitrust becomes obsolete, which
none of the authors in this symposium advocate, this democratic
government will not leave a vacuum in regulatory policy. If the
Reagan Administration's antitrust policy is to have lasting
import, it will be as a historical reminder to those who advocate
''zero sum" government control or intrusive industrial policy that
extremes beget extremes.
believes economic regulation works anymore," id. These statements
misconstrue the campaign views of candidates for the 1988 Democratic
Presidential nomination. Even George Bush, the likely Republican nom-
inee, while relying upon the support of President Reagan, has not
endorsed the libertarian extremism exemplified by Baxter and Fein.
HeinOnline -- 33 Antitrust Bull. 209 1988
